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This article introduces critical perspective into the
discussion of the digital divide, which is commonly
defined as the gap separating those individuals who have
access to new forms of information technology from those
who do not. The analysis is distinguished from other
undertakings addressing this matter, insofar as it does not
document the empirical problems of unequal access but
considers the terminology, logical structure, and form that
define and direct work on this important social and ethical
issue. The investigation employs the tools of critical theory
and targets extant texts, reports, and studies. In this way,
the analysis does not dispute the basic facts gathered in
recent empirical studies of computer usage and internet
access. On the contrary, its purpose is to assist these and
other endeavors by making evident their common starting
point, stakes, and consequences.
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The term ‘digital divide’ has come to occupy a privileged position in recent
debates about the internet, computer technology, and access to information
systems. It has surfaced, in one way or another, in scholarly studies and
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investigations, professional meetings and conferences, political speeches and
policy analysis, and the popular press and media.1 This attention to disparity
of access to, and use of, information technology (IT) appears to be an
obvious advance over the euphoric ‘cyberbole’ that characterized much of
the rhetoric of computer technology since the mid-1980s. In these initial
explanations and investigations, IT was routinely celebrated for creating a
new world of limitless opportunity that was liberated from problematic
sociocultural determinants, such as race, gender, age, and geography.2 The
digital divide supplies a much-needed critique of these often unquestioned
presumptions, showing that this utopian rhetoric remains oblivious to the
fact that access to technology is limited by specific circumstances, and
should not be assumed to be automatic or universally applicable.
But the critical standpoint introduced by the digital divide, no matter
how informative, is not simply insulated from critique. It also has a
perspective, and this has been defined by various decisions that delimit its
focus and scope. However, critical examinations of the digital divide appear
to be in short supply. The few commentaries that have been published are
little more than reactions and editorials which argue, mainly through
anecdotal evidence and personal opinion, that the divide is a myth (Brady,
2000; Cohen, 2000), political hyperbole (Horvath, 2000), bunk (Somerson,
2000), non-existent (Thierer, 2000), or rubbish (Crabtree, 2001). What is
needed, therefore, is neither uncritical adherence to, nor simple reaction
against, the digital divide but a critique that exposes and investigates the
problems inherent in both. However, ‘critique’ is a word that is not without
significant ambiguity. In colloquial usage, it has a negative definition,
indicating a form of judgmental evaluation or rudimentary fault-finding. It
is only under this denotation that the current commentaries and editorials
may be called ‘critiques’. But there is a more precise definition that is rooted
in the tradition of critical philosophy. As Barbara Johnson characterizes it: 
A critique of any theoretical system is not an examination of its flaws and
imperfections. It is not a set of criticisms designed to make the system better.
It is an analysis that focuses on the grounds of that system’s possibility. The
critique reads backwards from what seems natural, obvious, self-evident, or
universal, in order to show that these things have their history, their reasons for
being the way they are, their effects on what follows from them, and that the
starting point is not a given but a construct, usually blind to itself. (1981: xv)
The following investigation comprises this kind of operation. As such, the
analysis does not target flaws and imperfections. It does not attempt to point
out problems and difficulties. And it does not aim to provide solutions.
Instead, it examines the terminology, structure, and form that make
articulation of the problem of the digital divide possible. Such an
investigation will attend to the necessary, but often unexpressed,
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preconditions of the digital divide, trace their history and rationale, and
project the direction of their future examination.
TERMINOLOGY
The ‘digital divide’ is one of the most discussed social phenomena of our era.
It is also one of the most unclear and confusing. (Warschauer, 2001: 1)
The origin of the term ‘digital divide’ remains uncertain and ambiguous.
Recent publications and studies routinely reference ‘Falling Through the
Net: Defining the Digital Divide’, the third in a series of reports published
by the US Department of Commerce’s National Telecommunications and
Information Administration (NTIA, 1999). However, NTIA did not
originate this expression. Larry Irving, who was the Department of
Commerce’s Assistant Secretary for Communications and Information at the
time of the report’s composition and publication, provided a candid
explanation of this in a post to the Benton Foundation’s digital divide
discussion list:
I am certain I stole the term, but I am not certain who I stole it from.
Jonathan Webber of the Industry Standard makes a compelling case that
somewhere back around 1995 he and Amy Harmon (when both were with the
LA Times) invented the term to describe the social division between those who
were very involved in technology and those who were not. I believe I first
heard the term in the late ‘95/early ‘96 timeframe at a conference in a western
state, Montana, North Dakota or South Dakota. We did not formally use the
term at NTIA until months later, and the term did not gain the ubiquity it
enjoys today until the release of the third ‘Falling Through the Net’ report in
July ‘99. I hope that helps. The fairest thing to say is that no one at NTIA
invented the term, digital divide. NTIA’s reports were, however, the catalysts
for the popularity, ubiquity and redefinition (from the LA Times original usage)
of the term. (Digitaldivide, 2001: 2)
According to Irving, the ‘digital divide’ was appropriated from an
unknown source and redefined by the NTIA in the process of preparing the
third ‘Falling Through the Net’ report. The best guess Irving has for the
word’s origin is Jonathan Webber and Amy Harmon of the LA Times, who
began using it in 1996 to name differences in opinion about new
technology. But this assignment is not without complication. Andy Carvin,
of the Benton Foundation, agrees that Harmon may have been one of the
first journalists to use the term publicly, but argues, in a response to Irving’s
comment, that 1996 is ‘a little too recent for her to have actually coined it’
(Digitaldivide, 2001: 2). Carvin’s research indicates that the expression was
already being used to name a gap in educational opportunities by the
Clinton–Gore administration, Massachusetts congressman Ed Markey, and
New York Times reporter Gary Andrew Poole. He also cites Dinty Moore’s
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The Emperor’s Virtual Clothes (1995) as containing one of the earliest
occurrences of the phrase.
The definition of the term in these and subsequent places has not been
homogeneous or univocal. For example, Moore (1995) employed ‘digital
divide’ to distinguish between advocates and detractors in debates about the
value of IT. Harmon used the expression to name a similar concern in her
‘Daily Life’s Digital Divide’, a story published in the 29 July 1996 edition of
the LA Times (Harmon, 1996). Although Harmon’s story makes passing
reference to the ‘deepening divide between rich and poor’ (p. A1), the
digital divide in the headline refers not to the gap between information
haves and have-nots, but to a ‘voluntary partition . . . galvanized by
strongly-held views about whether today’s technology is a force for progress
or destruction’ (p. A1). For Harmon, as for Moore, the digital divide names
the difference of opinion that exists between those who are ‘deeply
suspicious of a new generation of engineering solutions to the world’s
problems’, and those who ‘insist that, this time around, the enlightenment
promise of better living through rationality and science will be realized’
(p. A1). At roughly the same time, the term was also employed to name the
unequal distribution of IT in American public schools. It appears, for
example, on 29 May 1996 in a speech delivered by then Vice-President Al
Gore, who used ‘digital divide’ to name the gap between the information
haves and have-nots in K-12 education.3 Beginning in 1996, the Clinton–
Gore administration employed the trope of the digital divide to justify
various educational initiatives and policies, and press coverage of these events
popularized this particular understanding and use of the term. However, this
denotation probably did not originate with the Clinton–Gore White House.
Just as it is doubtful that Gore ‘invented’ the internet or even the term
‘information superhighway’ (Gunkel, 2001: 63), evidence suggests that the
Clinton administration most likely appropriated the ‘digital divide’ from
other sources. In particular, the term had already been used in the context
of education by Congressman Markey in a 10 April 1996 press release
which addressed the proposed e-Rate; and by two journalists, Howard
Wolinsky of the Chicago Sun Times and Gary Andrew Poole of the New York
Times. On 17 March 1996, Wolinsky published ‘The Digital Divide’, which
examined how ‘unequal computer access for students is creating tomorrow’s
haves and have-nots’ (Wolinsky, 1996: 6). Two months earlier (29 January
1996), a New York Times article considered what Poole termed ‘A New Gulf
in American Education, the Digital Divide’ (Poole, 1996).
Subsequent usage does not conform to either precedent but adds further
denotations to the term’s already complicated definition. Beginning in 1997,
‘digital divide’ was used in a number of contexts to describe, not differences
of opinion about digital technology or inequalities in educational
opportunity, but technical incompatibilities. For example, Shawn Steward
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(1997) used the expression to name interoperability problems between
analog and digital cellphone networks. For Steward, ‘digital divide’ indicated
differences between the Time Division Multiple Access (TDMA) and Code
Division Multiple Access (CDMA) digital technologies and the Advanced
Mobile Phone Service (AMPS) analog system. The expression has also been
used to name similar incompatibles in analog and digital television (McRae,
1998; Mediaweek, 1997; Roberts, 1997), satellite transmission (Informa,
1997), and film and filmless radiology (Jones, 1999). In 1998, the San
Francisco Chronicle added yet one more denotation. Between May and August
of that year, the Chronicle published several stories investigating racial
diversity in the high-tech industries of Silicon Valley. The series began with
Julia Angwin and Laura Castaneda’s study, ‘The Digital Divide: High-tech
Boom a Bust for Blacks and Latinos’ (Angwin and Castaneda, 1998), which
concluded that
employment records for 33 of the leading Silicon Valley firms show that their
Bay Area staffs, on average, are about 4 percent black and 7 percent Latino –
even though blacks and Latinos make up 8 and 14 percent of the Bay Area
labor force respectively. (1998: A1)
For Angwin and Castaneda, ‘digital divide’ identifies a form of racial
discrimination situated in the unequal distribution of employment
opportunities. Similar usage occurs in Art Perio’s investigation of
‘institutionalized racism and employment patterns in the computer industry’
(2001: 1).
It is not until 1999 that the term appears in NTIA’s ‘Falling Through the
Net’. In this report, ‘digital divide’ is defined as ‘the divide between those
with access to new technologies and those without’ (NTIA, 1999: xiii). In
this way, ‘digital divide’ names a form of socioeconomic inequality
demarcated by the level of access that one has to IT. Therefore, ‘digital
divide’ functions as another name for a problem that had previously been
identified by a number of other expressions – information haves and have-
nots, the question of access, and universal service. But even within this
particular usage of the term there is considerable equivocation. First, the
NTIA has not been consistent. The meaning of ‘digital divide’ has changed
from study to study. As Benjamin Compaine points out:
In the original iteration of the NTIA surveys it meant primarily personal
computer ownership. More recently it has come to incorporate internet access.
The latest noises [are] that it further delineates those with high speed
(broadband) access from slower dial-up modem access. (Compaine, 2001: xiii)
Second, the Benton Foundation’s Digital Divide Network, which
comprises one of the largest databases concerning digital divide issues,
modifies the NTIA’s definition. For the Benton Foundation (2001), the
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digital divide names the ‘gap between those who can effectively use new
information and communication tools, such as the internet, and those who
cannot’ (p. 1). According to this characterization, access to technology is not
the only, or even the most important, determination. Beyond access to
equipment, individuals need to know how to employ it.
In the end, the digital divide has changing denotations and is, as
Compaine advises, ‘a moving target’ (2001: 5). It not only names different
kinds of technological and social differences but, even when it appears to
refer to the same object, does so differently at different times and in
different contexts. This complexity does not derive from some univocal
origin that subtends and anchors the multiplicity. It is not some form of
terminological confusion that subsequently has come to afflict what initially
had been a pure and homogeneous concept. Instead, the ‘digital divide’ is
originally and persistently plural. This plurality has at least two
consequences. First, there is not one digital divide; there is a constellation of
different and intersecting social, economic, and technological differences, all
of which are properly named ‘digital divide’. Although these various
inequalities and discrepancies may be related to one another, it would be
hasty and inaccurate to conclude that they are identical. This means, on the
one hand, that studies of the ‘digital divide’ need to learn how the various
problems marked by this appellation relate to, interact with, and influence
each other. For example, employment discrimination in the high-tech
industry is certainly related to discrepancies in educational opportunities and
access to technology. On the other hand, these different issues should not be
conflated. The problem of employment discrimination cannot be reduced to
differences in access to technology or adequately addressed by the singular
effort to wire all American schools to the internet. The situation is more
complex and involves a number of different variables that need to be taken
into account.
Second, despite the value placed on consistent and precise use of
terminology, lexical multiplicity is not necessarily a deficiency. It is not
always a semantic problem to be resolved by prescribing, even provisionally,
a univocal and noiseless definition. Because IT has evolved at historically
unprecedented rates, the various problems that are associated with it also
experience accelerated change. This is one reason for the variability in the
NTIA reports. The changing definition of the digital divide is not the result
of capriciousness or an inability to be precise. It has varied because the
technology in question has changed considerably. For example, the NTIA’s
first report, ‘Falling Through the Net: A Survey of the “Have-Nots” in
Rural and Urban America’ (NTIA, 1995), was published in July 1995 and
relied on data collected by the US Bureau of the Census in 1994. At this
time, the internet was still considered the specialized domain of academics,
defense contractors, and computer enthusiasts. For this reason, the first
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report does not address differences in internet access and usage, but limits its
investigation to telephone service and computer and modem ownership. By
the time the third report was published in July 1999, however, the internet
was recognized as one of the fundamental technologies comprising the
nation’s information infrastructure. As a result, the third report addresses
‘which American households have access to telephones, computers, and the
internet and which do not’ (1999: xiii). In this way, the locus and object of
the ‘digital divide’ was updated from the time of the first report to adapt to
changes in technology. What is necessary in this situation is not the
application of some rigid and univocal definition, but a flexible
characterization that can respond to, and function in, this protean
environment. Because the problems of the digital divide have been, and
probably will continue to be, moving targets, the term’s definition should be
similarly mobile.
STRUCTURE
Someone once wittily remarked that the world is divided into those who
divide people into two types, and those who don’t. (Chandler, 1994: 1)
No matter how it is defined, the digital divide organizes things into two,
dialectically-opposed types. The NTIA segregates American households into
those who have access to IT and those who do not. The Benton
Foundation (2001) draws a similar distinction, dividing between those who
can use technology and those who cannot. Harmon (1996) and Moore
(1995) differentiate between ‘techno-utopians’, who celebrate the wonders
of digital technology, and ‘techno-dystopians’, who do not. And the
Clinton–Gore administration (Gore, 1998), Congressman Markey, and Poole
(1996) address the gap that exists between information haves and
information have-nots in K-12 education. Consequently, despite apparent
variation in its referent, the digital divide is articulated in digital form. It
represents its problematic according to a binary logic, dividing things into
one of two types, where the one option is nominally defined as the negative
or antithesis of the other. This dichotomized structure, although useful for
describing the limits of various social and technological inequalities, is not
without significant complications and difficulties.
By taking the form of a dichotomy, the digital divide participates in what
Daniel Chandler (1994: 1) calls ‘great divide theories’. According to
Chandler, these theories became prominent during the 1960s with the
publication of a number of studies (e.g. Goody, 1968; Havelock, 1963; Le´vi-
Strauss, 1966; McLuhan, 1962) which addressed the differences between
literate and non-literate cultures. As Chandler argues:
Such theories tend to suggest radical, deep, and basic differences between
modes of thinking in non-literate and literate societies. They are often
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associated with attempts to develop grand theories of social organization and
development. (1994: 1)
Chandler (and others) argue that the difficulty with the ‘great literacy
divide’ rests in the incompatibility between the seemingly rigid and often
simplistic binary representation and its referent, which is usually perceived as
being a complex continuum. The binary form ‘literate/non-literate’, for
example, has been perceived as an exaggeration and even a false dichotomy.
As Warschauer (2001) points out, subsequent studies of literacy have revealed
that there is not one, but many types of literacy (Cope and Kalantzis, 2000;
Gee, 1996), that the meaning and value of literacy is not homogeneous but
varies according to social circumstances (de Castell and Luke, 1986; Street,
1984); and that these different literacies exist on a continuum and do not
take the form of a simple binary opposition (Gee, 1996). Consequently, the
‘all or nothing’ scenario that is presented by great divide theories often does
not adequately represent the actual state of affairs. Or as Harvey Graff
describes it, ‘none of these polar opposites usefully describe actual
circumstances; all of them, in fact, preclude contextual understanding’
(Graff, 1987: 24).
Similar criticism has been applied to the various dichotomies that
compose the ‘digital divide’. The dialectically-opposed perspectives of
techno-utopia and techno-dystopia, for example, are not usually experienced
as an either/or option. Instead, they delimit a continuum that contains
many intervening possibilities for how one understands technology and its
social effects. Andrew Shapiro’s The Control Revolution (1999) contests the
extremes that define the current debate about the internet and advocates a
more balanced understanding:
Technology is not like anchovies, which some people can love and others hate,
nor is it like the right to abortion, which some are for and others are against.
Rather, it is an indelible feature of our cultural environment – one we must
strive to understand in all its gray-shaded complexity . . . (p. xvi)
Similarly access to, and use of, IT is not something that is easily encoded
in binary form. Although the digital divide is often characterized as the gap
between the information haves and have-nots, it is not the case that one
either possesses information or does not. Instead, there is significant
variability in the forms of information which one possesses and the modes
of its access and use. Warschauer provides an instructive illustration:
Compare, for example, a professor at UCLA with a high-speed ‘internet II’
connection in her office, a student in Seoul who uses a cyber-cafe, and a rural
activist in Indonesia who has no computer or phone line but whose colleagues
in her NGO download information for her. The notion of a binary divide is
thus inaccurate and can be patronizing, as it fails to value the social resources
that diverse groups bring to the table. (2001: 1)
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Although the dichotomies of the digital divide have been expedient for
describing sociotechnological differences, the binary form necessarily risks
oversimplifying the situation and neglecting the important variations that
exist in the object of study. Because of this, it appears that what is necessary
is an alternative formulation – one that does not distinguish between two
opposed alternatives, but becomes capable of perceiving and articulating fine
gradations within complex conglomerates. According to Chandler (1994),
the alternatives to great divide theories are sometimes called ‘continuity
theories’. These theories ‘stress a “continuum” rather than a radical
discontinuity’ and ‘an ongoing dynamic interaction between various media’
instead of a mutually exclusive, either/or opposition (p. 2). For example,
Warschauer suggests that the digital divide be redefined as a ‘social
stratification’, which ‘indicates that the “divide” is not really a binary
division at all, but rather a continuum based on different degrees of access
to information technology’ (2001: 1). Some studies, most notably the third,
fourth and fifth NTIA reports (1999, 2000, 2002), have attempted to
distinguish varying degrees of internet use based on where one accesses the
network and the kind of equipment that is employed. Such approaches,
which are consistent with the development of alternative strategies in the
study of literacy, appear to provide a mode of inquiry that is not limited by
the restrictive ‘either/or’ logic.
However, the problem with binary logic is not simply the inability of a
linguistic dichotomy to represent a complex state of affairs. The difficulty
resides in its structure. The distinction between the ‘information haves’ and
‘information have-nots’, for example, is articulated in such a way that the
latter is both segregated from, and defined in opposition to, the former. But
these two possibilities are not on an equal footing. The ‘information haves’
are not only characterized positively but are presumed to be in the desirable
position. The ‘information have-nots’ are defined, quite literally, by what
they lack in comparison to the ‘information haves’. They comprise the
negative counterpart and undesirable version of their positively-defined
other. This formulation, although useful for identifying extant technological
and social inequalities, has potentially disquieting ethical consequences,
especially when applied in a global context. In distinguishing ‘information
haves’ from ‘information have-nots’, the technologically-privileged situate
their experiences with technology as normative, so that those without access
to similar systems and capabilities become perceived as deficient and lacking.
This evaluation, which establishes an asymmetrical hierarchy, is not
substantially modified by including intervening stages in the binary structure,
for the other would still be defined negatively by what they lack in
comparison to the technologically-privileged. Defining others as existing in
various states of deficiency, however, can be interpreted as arrogant and
paternalistic. Although the internet is potentially useful in some highly-
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specific sociocultural situations, it is not an unqualified and unquestioned
human good. Unlike clean water, nutritious food, and adequate shelter, the
value of this technology has been determined by unique circumstances that
are only applicable to a small fraction of the world’s population. In defining
others as deficient, one does not simply provide a neutral expression of
inequality. The very technique by which the discrepancy is articulated
necessarily employs an asymmetrical logic that already warrants the position
of a privileged minority, and depreciates and simplifies the situation of
others.
Given this structural difficulty, the task of criticism might appear to be to
escape binary logic, replacing the dichotomies of the digital divide with
something that is less decisive and derisive. This proposal would be fantastic
if not impossible. The binary structure that is evident in the concept of the
digital divide is neither unique nor voluntary. In fact, such logic organizes
and informs the entire event-horizon of the Western episteme, up to and
including that by which one would describe and/or criticize this tradition as
such. Binary logic, as poststructuralists have demonstrated, underlies,
organizes, and animates all possible modes of knowing – scientific,
mathematical, critical, and even everyday language. As Mark Dery explains
it:
Western systems of meaning are underwritten by binary oppositions which
include, among others: self/other, mind/body, culture/nature, male/female,
civilized/primitive, reality/appearance, whole/part, agent/resource, maker/
made, active/passive, right/wrong, truth/illusion, totality/partiality. (Dery,
1996: 244)
If all meaningful discourse is generated in and by using binary terms, then
there is, strictly speaking, nothing of significance outside this system. In
other words, it may not be possible to think, speak, or reason otherwise.
What is required, therefore, is a procedure that not only recognizes this
requirement but learns how to operate in this curious and complex
situation.
This insight furnishes at least three conclusions which are useful for
understanding the digital divide and directing its critical investigation. First,
the examination of the divide needs to develop a sense of self-reflexivity.
Although empirical studies adequately diagnose and quantify the gap that
currently exists, for example, between information haves and have-nots, they
do not explicitly recognize how this apparently altruistic endeavor might
also entail significant ethical complications. In structuring its problematic in
the form of a binary opposition – a structure that is logically necessary and
not merely optional – the digital divide does not simply identify a kind of
sociotechnological discrimination, but already entails evaluative decisions that
encompass potentially disturbing forms of prejudice. Consequently, the
New Media & Society 5(4)
508
structure of the problem may itself be a problem. Second, the examination
of this binary opposition cannot take place except by employing what is
investigated. Because binary logic underwrites all possible modes of
meaning, it also governs any and all attempts to question and criticize this
structure as such. Or as Chandler cleverly demonstrates, one is compelled to
employ binary logic even when questioning and describing the limits of
such logic (1994: 1). Therefore, the binary structure of the digital divide is
not something one can surpass, overcome, or even avoid. It delimits both
the articulation of the problem and the parameters of any meaningful
critique. Consequently, the task of criticism is not to break out of this logic
but to learn how to use it to question its own limits and exigencies. Finally,
and as a result of this situation, there neither is, nor can be, finality. As Mark
Taylor points out: ‘Leading poststructuralists realize that since they remain
unavoidably entangled in the systems and structures they resist, the task of
criticism is endless’ (1997: 269). Criticism of the digital divide, therefore, is
not some singular undertaking with definite goals and a conclusive solution.
It is, and remains, an ongoing project – one that must continually submit its
own findings to the process of criticism.
FORM
Despite the media’s penchant for beating to death anything to do with the
Internet, a new phrase has recently entered the public’s online lexicon, one
that actually carries significant societal ramifications: the ‘digital divide’.
(Carvin, 2001: 56)
The digital divide is concerned not so much with technology as with its
‘significant societal ramifications’. The effect of technology in the social
sphere has often been posed in the terms of technological determinism.
According to Chandler: 
The technological determinist view is a technology-led theory of social change:
technology is seen as the ‘prime mover’ in history. According to technological
determinists, particular technical developments, communication technologies
or media, or, most broadly, technology in general are the sole or prime
antecedent cause of change in society, and technology is seen as the
fundamental condition underlying the pattern of social organization.
(Chandler, 1995: 2) 
This particular formulation of a causal connection between technology and
society is usually credited to American sociologist Thorstein Veblen
(Chandler, 1996: 2; Ellul, 1964: xviii; Jones, 1990: 210). It becomes an
influential theory in the sociology of communication through the work of
individuals such as Charles Horton Cooley, who argued that ‘we understand
nothing rightly unless we perceive the manner in which the revolution in
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communication has made a new world for us’ (1962: 65). And it plays a
constitutive role in the fields of technology and media studies (Ellul, 1964;
Innis, 1951; McLuhan, 1962). Since its introduction at the turn of the last
century, technological determinism has developed into two subsets generally
called ‘hard’ and ‘soft determinism’. Hard determinism makes technology the
sufficient or necessary condition for social change, while soft determinism
understands technology to be a key factor that may facilitate change.
Although these two modes are distinguished from one another, the
boundary between them is often blurry and flexible. As Ruth Finnegan
points out, ‘it is easy to slide from one to another without realizing where
one is being led’ (1975: 105).
Despite several decades of healthy skepticism (Finnegan, 1975; MacKenzie
and Wajcman, 1985; Postman, 1993; Smith and Marx, 1994), technological
determinism figures prominently in the rhetoric of computers and the
internet. For instance, Jay David Bolter’s Turing’s Man (1984) argues that the
computer redefines ‘man’s role in relation to nature’ (p. 13), producing ‘a
change in the way men and women in the electronic age think about
themselves and the world around them’ (p. 4). In his 1995 bestseller, Being
Digital, Nicholas Negroponte distinguishes bits from atoms and argues that
bits of digital information introduce revolutionary changes in
communication, education, politics, entertainment, and human
communities. And the work of Alvin Toffler (1980), which figures
prominently in the ideology of techno-libertarians, divides history into three
distinct ‘waves’, which are primarily defined by the technological
innovations of agriculture, industrial production, and information systems.
The reports, texts, and discussions of the digital divide do not question this
prevailing technological determinism, but exploit it. First, no matter how
the digital divide has been defined, it assumes radical and persistent
differences between distinct socioeconomic forms and defines these
difference technologically. The discourse of the digital divide employs the
distinctions between digital and analog technology, the ‘new digital
economy’ of e-commerce and the ‘old economy’ of industrialized
production, the Information Age and the Industrial Age, and the
opportunities enjoyed by those individuals who are able to participate in the
‘digital revolution’ and the unfortunate experiences of those who cannot.
Indicative of this form of technological determinism is the US Department
of Commerce’s The Emerging Digital Economy reports, which complement the
NTIA’s Digital Divide studies (NTIA, 1999: 1). In the introduction to the
first Emerging Digital Economy publication (April 1998), the authors
differentiate between two socioeconomic revolutions, each of which is
defined and propelled by technological innovations – the Industrial
Revolution, which ‘was powered by the steam engine, invented in 1712,
and electricity, first harnessed in 1831’, and the digital revolution, driven by
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information technology and ‘the harnessing of light for nearly instantaneous
communication’ (p. 1). In the discussions and debates concerning the digital
divide, the computer and the internet are not just another convenience.
They are often assumed to be epoch-defining technologies that determine
radically new socioeconomic opportunities for individuals and institutions.
Second, in the rhetoric of the various digital divide studies and reports
one finds both hard and soft forms of technological determinism. For
example, the gap between the information haves and have-nots is not just
another socioeconomic division. As Compaine (2001: 333–4) points out, the
question concerning access to IT is approached as a unique disparity that is
not on par with other kinds of technological inequalities, such as that
existing between individuals who have access to automobile transportation
and those who do not. Instead, the digital divide is perceived to be a
definitive social issue. It is characterized as such, because the technology in
question is assumed to effect socioeconomic opportunity and success. This
understanding often takes the form of hard determinism. This is especially
evident in political speeches, where digital technology is presented as the
sufficient cause of social change. Former Vice-President Al Gore is probably
best-known for this kind of rhetoric:
We meet today to break down walls. At each critical point in our nation’s
history, we have acted on our duty to give every citizen the chance to live out
the American Dream. In the Agricultural Age, we ensured that land went not
only to the privileged few, but to the common yeoman farmer. In the
Industrial Age, we focused on making sure that all Americans – and not just
the industrial barons – had access to capital. Today in the Information Age,
connecting all people to a universe of knowledge and learning is the key to
ensuring a lifetime of success. (1998: 1)
Other times, the demonstration employs a softer approach, suggesting that
information technology may contribute to social transformation. For
example, Compaine finds that ‘access to the information available from
networked devices may be critical in the education process – for both
teachers and students. But will the stakes be as high as some prognosticators
proclaim?’ (2001: xiii). And sometimes the rhetoric of the digital divide
drifts, as Finnegan (1975) explains, from one form of determinism to the
other. For example, the third NTIA report begins with Irving’s
proclamation that the digital divide ‘is now one of America’s leading
economic and civil rights issues’ (1999: xiii). It ends, however, with a more
modest and measured assessment: ‘To be connected today increasingly means
to have access to telephones, computers, and the internet. While these items
may not be necessary for survival, arguably in today’s emerging digital
economy they are necessary for success’ (1999: 77).
Discussion of the digital divide regularly employs elements of
technological determinism. This is a potential difficulty not only because
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technological determinism, as a general theory of social change, remains
controversial, but because there are specific problems with the technological
determinist perspective as it applies to computer technology. First, the
theory of technological determinism is refuted by two other theories
concerning the relationship between technology and society – sociocultural
determinism and volunteerism. According to Chandler, the former ‘presents
technologies and media as entirely subordinate to their development and use
in particular sociopolitical, historical, and culturally specific contexts’, and
the latter ‘emphasizes individual control over the tools which they see
themselves as “choosing” to use’ (1996: 2). Both alternatives complicate the
technological determinist perspective. Although the various empirical studies
and reports addressing the digital divide (Katz and Aspden, 1997; Novak and
Hoffman, 1998; National Public Radio (NPR) et al., 2000; NTIA, 1995,
1998, 1999, 2000, 2002; Walsh, 2000) employ forms of technological
determinism in constructing their hypotheses and conclusions, they often
support the theory of sociocultural determinism in the course of their
investigations. In the diagnostic phase, these different studies find that access
to, and use of, IT is dependent on social and economic conditions. For
example, the first NTIA report (1995) discovers that geography is an
important factor in defining the divide between information haves and
have-nots. The third report demonstrates that race is a significant element
and argues that the digital divide is actually a ‘racial ravine’ (NTIA, 1999:
8). And the 2000 Forrester brief, penned by Ekaterina Walsh (Walsh, 2000),
discovers that it is personal income that makes up the primary and
determining factor. Although there is still significant debate over the exact
cause of the digital discrepancy, survey research demonstrates that social,
cultural, and economic opportunities play a constitutive role in determining
the level of one’s access to, and ability to use, IT. In other words access to,
and use of, technology appears to be a symptom and not the cause of
socioeconomic opportunity. Therefore, what the empirical studies
demonstrate is that the theory of technological determinism, although
persuasively deployed in the rhetoric of the digital divide, remains an
inadequate explanation of the problem and risks oversimplifying a situation
that is obviously more complex.
The perspective of volunteerism introduces additional complications. In
modern philosophy, volunteerism – which emphasizes an active agent’s
individual freedom to choose between competing alternatives – is
traditionally opposed to determinism, which proposes what is often
described as a mechanistic model of causation. For this reason, volunteerism
has been employed by humanists, existentialists, and other individuals who
‘insist that people are active agents and not helpless automatons’ that are
determined by sociocultural or technological circumstances (Chandler, 1995:
19). In The Labyrinths of Literacy, for example, Graff (1987) counters the
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technological determinist perspective in literacy studies by employing a
volunteerist argument. According to Graff, ‘neither writing nor printing
alone is an “agent of change”; their impacts are determined by the manner
in which human agency exploits them in a specific setting’ (1987: 19).
Similar arguments have been made for studies of the digital divide.
Compaine argues that the almost undocumented existence of voluntary
non-users significantly complicates the statistics:
In the statistics on nonsubscribers to telephone, cable service, PC ownership or
internet connectivity there has been scant attention paid to voluntary nonusers.
There is both anecdotal evidence and increasing statistical verification that large
numbers of individuals are voluntary non-participants . . . The Cheskin
Research study of Hispanic households found that the second most voiced
reason for not owning a computer, nearly 40%, was ‘don’t need.’ Another six
percent had similar reasons – ‘too old’ or ‘not interested.’ This is generally
consistent with the NPR/Kaiser Foundation/Kennedy School survey . . . Of
those characterizing themselves as being ‘left behind’ in computers, barely 20%
blamed cost. A third were just not interested. (2001: 328)
Studies of the digital divide, therefore, appear to overemphasize
sociotechnological factors at the expense of individual volition.
Consequently, critics of current digital divide studies point out that the
world is not simply divided into information haves and have-nots. There are
also information want-nots (Brady, 2000; NTIA, 2000; Van Dijk, 2000) and
even internet drop-outs (Katz and Aspden, 1998) – those who had access at
one time and decide, for various reasons, against continued use. Accordingly,
studies of the digital divide have been denounced for being too
deterministic and neglecting these important voluntary aspects affecting
access to and use of new technology.
Second, the social impact of computer technology is debated and
inconclusive. Citing a study conducted by Carnegie-Mellon University,
Hubert Dreyfus (2001) concludes that the internet has not provided the
kind of social improvement that is espoused in the technical, academic, and
popular presses:
We are told that, given its new way of linking and accessing information, the
Internet will bring a new era of economic prosperity, lead to the development
of intelligent search engines that will deliver to us just the information we
desire, solve the problems of mass education, put us in touch with all of reality,
allow us to have even more flexible identities than we already have and thereby
add new dimensions of meaning to our lives. But, compared with the relative
success of e-commerce, the other areas where a new and more fulfilling form
of life has been promised have produced a great deal of talk but few happy
results. (2001: 2)
Similar disappointments with the social promise of computer technology
have been registered by Neil Postman (1993), Zillah Eisenstein (1998),
Gunkel: Second thoughts
513
Gordon Graham (1999), and Kevin Robins and Frank Webster (1999).
Although the digital divide studies situate computer technology as a force
for positive social change, this assumption is neither universally accepted nor
without considerable debate. In fact, one must remember that the
determinist perspective can be, and has been, employed to explain both
positive and negative social transformation. Jacques Ellul (1964), for
example, argues that technology is not necessarily a progressive force, but
also produces new sociocultural conflicts and uncertainties.
Complicating this insight is the fact that technology is often employed in
ways that deviate from its intended or projected use. As William Gibson
points out: ‘The street finds its own use for things – uses the manufacturers
never imagined’ (1993: 29). This is especially true for the internet, which
was initially developed by the US Department of Defense for the purposes
of telecomputing and research but was actually utilized by participants as a
medium of communication (Gunkel, 2001; Hafner and Lyon, 1996). The
digital divide reports position the internet as a tool for lifelong learning, job
improvement, and democratic participation (NTIA, 1999). However, data
concerning actual use contest this. Both the 1998 and 1999 NTIA surveys
and the Forrester brief (Walsh, 2000), find that users employ the internet for
purposes other than the projected social and political improvements. As
Compaine points out: 
The surveys have found that services such as chat rooms (sex is popular),
sports, and game playing top the list of activities. It is wonderful having access
to news and finance and diverse opinions from providers who would never
have a world wide audience pre-Internet. But as the research presented in this
volume and elsewhere repeatedly confirms, once digitally enabled, all groups –
by income, ethnicity, gender and education – fall into almost identical patterns
of usage. (2001: 332)
Despite assurance to the contrary, IT is not necessarily experienced as ‘a
leading civil rights issue’. Although the internet may provide some minor
improvements in education, career development, and retail shopping, there
remains significant dissonance between the socioeconomic liberation
promised in the rhetoric of the internet and the actual patterns of use
discovered in the empirical surveys.
Finally, history is against us here. The sociocultural opportunities
promoted in the technological determinist rhetoric of the internet is
nothing new. Similar promises have been made for other forms of IT.
Electric telegraphy, for example, was introduced with a kind of messianic
narrative. According to James Carey, 
this new technology entered American discussions not as a mundane fact but as
divinely inspired for the purposes of spreading the Christian message farther
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and faster, eclipsing time and transcending space, saving the heathen, bringing
closer and making more probable the day of salvation. (1989: 17)
Similar assurances were associated with radio during the first three
decades of its development and commercial expansion. As Martin Spinelli
demonstrates in his 1996 article ‘Radio Lessons for the Internet’, wireless
technology was ‘instilled with the hopes of initiating utopian democracy,
providing for universal and equal education, and bringing a sense of
belonging and community’ (1996: 1). These promises, which bear an
uncanny resemblance to the rhetoric of the internet, were espoused by
industry leaders such as David Sarnoff, government officials and agencies
such as Herbert Hoover4 and the Federal Communications Commission,
and cultural critics such as Hans Magnus Enzensberger, Rudolf Arnheim,
and Bertolt Brecht. However, the history of telegraphy and radio
demonstrate that both forms of IT were unable to effect these fantastic
social promises. The evolving telegraphic network did not hasten the
coming of the kingdom of heaven but supported nationalist aggression and
empire-building (De Landa, 1991; Mattelart, 1994, 1996). As Steven Lubar
notes: ‘The messages that passed through these far-flung communications
links were messages not of peace and unity but of unprecedented
technological warfare’ (1993: 89). Radio also failed to deliver on its
projected social transformations. The technology of wireless communication
evolved to serve military purposes (De Landa, 1991; Lubar, 1993) and the
profit motives of corporations (Spinelli, 1996). There is, therefore, significant
dissonance between the projected social impact attributed to a particular
technology and the actual effects that are observed to follow from its
development and proliferation. If telegraph and radio failed to fulfill the
promises of participatory democracy, new economic opportunities, and
social improvement, one should be skeptical of similar technological
determinist rhetoric when applied to the internet. In stating this, one is not
arguing that the internet will necessarily follow the historical precedent
established by other forms of media, especially broadcast communication.
Such a position amounts to a kind of naive ‘historical determinism’ and
would not be attentive to the important qualitative differences that exist
between these technologies. Instead, the issue is the theory of technological
determinism and the way that it has functioned in the history of
communication technology. As with the internet, telegraph and radio were
at one time new technologies that were introduced and associated with the
promise of sociocultural liberation. Unfortunately, neither technology
delivered on what was promised. Therefore, the history of telegraphy and
radio do not prescribe some fated destiny for the internet, but merely
indicate that there are good reasons to be skeptical of technological




Anyone who practices the art of cultural criticism must endure being asked,
What is the solution to the problems you describe? (Postman, 1993: 181)
Critique of the digital divide does not identify difficulties in order to
correct them but aims to articulate the necessary and often unexamined
preconditions that organize and underlie its discussions, debates, reports, and
examinations. This form of investigation does not contest the data that has
been collected, dispute the analyses that have been published, or undermine
the work that has been and continues to be done. On the contrary, the
purpose of critique is to assist these and future endeavors by making evident
their starting points, stakes, and consequences. To have second thoughts
about the digital divide is not to question the validity or importance of the
different social and technological issues that are identified by this term.
‘Second thoughts’ means rethinking the problematic of the digital divide,
exposing its assumptions, and explicating how such preconditions authorize
and regulate its examination and proposed reparation.
At the end, then, what we have are not conclusive solutions to specific
problems but guidelines for understanding and questioning the issues of the
digital divide. First, the term ‘digital divide’ is originally equivocal,
irreducibly plural, and constantly flexible. It names not one problem, but a
changing constellation of different and not always related concerns.
Unfortunately, ‘digital divide’ is something that has been used far too
casually in industry, government, and the academy. The goal of criticism is
not to formalize a rigid and univocal definition. The fact is, the phrase will
probably continue to be plural and multifaceted. Instead, the task is to help
delimit the range of possible denotations and to assist digital divide discourse
in understanding the complexity and nuances of the various problems that
have been collected under this appellation. What is needed, therefore, is not
a precise and exclusive definition, but an understanding of the essential
polysemia that already characterizes the term ‘digital divide’. Such
understanding will not only help to abate terminological equivocation, but
will foster a more discerning conceptualization of the digital divide’s
fundamental plurality.
Second, no matter what socioeconomic or technological differences the
term ‘digital divide’ identifies, it projects a binary structure. It describes its
various concerns by differentiating between two variables, where one
comprises the negation or antithesis of the other. This binary opposition not
only is unable to represent something that essentially resists division into a
simple either/or dichotomy, but also institutes an asymmetrical hierarchy.
The issue, then, is not just the inability of language to describe a complex
state of affairs but the implicit value judgements that are already encoded in
the structure of a dichotomy where the two terms are not on equal footing.
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The task of criticism is not to break out of this binary logic, which would
be nonsense, but to learn to use it to develop self-reflection. Therefore, the
task is to question the terms and conditions by which studies of the digital
divide define their own mode of questioning. Doing so will help to ensure
that examinations of the digital divide do not proceed blindly, but
understand the structure and consequences necessarily imposed by their own
problematic.
Third, the examinations and discussions of the digital divide, whether
executed in government reports, popular media, or academic analyses, rely
on and deploy elements of technological determinism. In fact, it is through
the common and often unacknowledged assumption of this perspective that
the problem of the ‘digital divide’ becomes something worth studying,
discussing, and debating. Technological determinism is a persuasive position
– socioeconomic problems are reduced to technological issues so that
investment in technology is directly associated with social and economic
improvement. But the issues are more complex. The purpose of critique is
not to overturn or repair technological determinism, but to expose and
make explicit the way this particular theory organizes the definition of the
problem of the digital divide and the range of its possible reparations. In
formulating this position, other theories of social change, such as
sociocultural determinism and volunteerism, although no less controversial,
can provide critical foils for questioning and investigating digital divide
rhetoric. It is, then, not a matter of finding the ‘right’ theory and applying
it consistently, but of using theory dynamically to open the ‘digital divide’
to critical reflection. Understanding how the theory of technological
determinism participates in shaping the problematic of the digital divide is
indispensable for anyone interested in evaluating the studies, reports, and
proposals addressing this important sociotechnological issue.
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Notes
1 For examples, see the following:
(1) academic studies – Bolt and Crawford (2000); Bucy (2000); Compaine (2001);
Ebo (1998); Hoffman et al. (2000); Katz and Aspden (1997); Lenhart (2000);
Novak and Hoffman (1998); Walsh (2000); Wilhelm (2001); Wresch (1996);
(2) professional meetings and conferences – Digital Nations Summit (2000); Harvard/
MIT eDevelopment conference (2000); National Communication Association
annual conference (2000, 2001, 2002); The Technology Alliance conference on
Seeking Solutions to the Digital Divide (1999);
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(3) political speeches and policy studies – Benton Foundation (2001); Gore (1998);
House of Representatives (1999, 2000); National Telecommunications and
Information Administration (NTIA) (1998, 1999, 2000, 2002);
(4) popular press and media – American Broadcasting Companies (ABC), Inc. (1999);
Burkeman (1998); Michel (2001); National Public Radio (NPR) (2000); Public
Broadcasting System (PBS) (2001); Schrader (2000); Taylor (2000).
2 For examples, see Barlow (1994, 1997); Benedikt (1993); Dery (1994); Dyson et al.
(1996); Gans and Sirius (1991); Negroponte (1995); Rheingold (1993); Schuman
(1988).
3 ‘K-12’ is a term that is specific to the American system of education. It denotes
‘kindergarten through 12th grade’, which means that it functions as a generic term
indicating both primary and secondary education.
4 David Sarnoff (1891–1971), a pioneer in the development of radio and television
broadcasting, became president of the Radio Corporation of America (RCA) in 1930.
Herbert Hoover (1874–1964), who was US Secretary of Commerce under Presidents
Harding and Coolidge, was instrumental in shaping public policy in the early days of
radio broadcasting. In 1929, he became the 31st President of the United States.
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